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Abstract
We demonstrate that the Conditional Entropy Bot-
tleneck (CEB) can improve model robustness.
CEB is an easy strategy to implement and works
in tandem with data augmentation procedures.
We report results of a large scale adversarial
robustness study on CIFAR-10, as well as the
ImageNet-C Common Corruptions Benchmark,
ImageNet-A, and PGD attacks.
1. Introduction
We aim to learn models that make meaningful predictions
beyond the data they were trained on. Generally we want
our models to be robust. Broadly, robustness is the ability of
a model to continue making valid predictions as the distribu-
tion the model is tested on moves away from the empirical
training set distribution. The most commonly reported ro-
bustness metric is simply test set performance, where we
verify that our model continues to make valid predictions
on what we hope represents valid draws from the same data
generating procedure as the training set.
Adversarial attacks test robustness in a worst case setting,
where an attacker (Szegedy et al., 2013) makes limited
targeted modifications to the input that are as fooling as
possible. Many adversarial attacks have been proposed
and studied (e.g., Szegedy et al. (2013); Carlini & Wag-
ner (2017b;a); Kurakin et al. (2016a); Madry et al. (2017)).
Most machine-learned systems appear to be vulnerable to
adversarial examples. Many defenses have been proposed,
but few have demonstrated robustness against a powerful,
general-purpose adversary (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Atha-
lye et al., 2018). Recent discussions have emphasized the
need to consider forms of robustness besides adversarial (En-
gstrom et al., 2019). The Common Corruptions Bench-
mark (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019) measures image mod-
els’ robustness to more mild real-world perturbations. Even
these modest perturbations can fool traditional architectures.
One general-purpose strategy that has been shown to im-
prove model robustness is data augmentation (Cubuk et al.,
2018; Lopes et al., 2019; Yin et al., 2019). Intuitively, by
performing modifications of the inputs at training time, the
model is prevented from being too sensitive to particular
features of the inputs that don’t survive the augmentation
procedure. We would like to identify complementary tech-
niques for further improving robustness.
One approach is to try to make our models more robust
by making them less sensitive to the inputs in the first
place. The goal of this work is to experimentally inves-
tigate whether, by systematically limiting the complexity of
the extracted representation using the Conditional Entropy
Bottleneck (CEB), we can make our models more robust
in all three of these senses: test set generalization (e.g.,
classification accuracy on “clean” test inputs), worst-case
robustness, and typical-case robustness.
1.1. Contributions
This paper is primarily empirical. We demonstrate:
• CEB models are easy to implement and train.
• CEB models show improved generalization performance
over deterministic baselines on CIFAR10 and ImageNet.
• CEB models show improved robustness to untargeted
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attacks on CIFAR10.
• CEB models trained on ImageNet show improved robust-
ness on the ImageNet-C Common Corruptions Bench-
mark, the ImageNet-A Benchmark, and targeted PGD
attacks.
We also show that adversarially-trained models fail to gen-
eralize to attacks they weren’t trained on, by comparing
the results on L2 PGD attacks from Madry et al. (2017)
to our results on the same baseline architecture. This re-
sult underscores the importance of finding ways to make
models robust that do not rely on knowing the form of the
attack ahead of time. Finally, for readers who are curious
about theoretical and philosophical perspectives that may
give insights into why CEB improves robustness, we rec-
ommend Fischer (2018), which introduced CEB, as well
as Achille & Soatto (2017) and Achille & Soatto (2018).
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2. Background
2.1. Information Bottlenecks
The Information Bottleneck (IB) objective (Tishby et al.,
2000) aims to learn a stochastic representation Z ∼ p(z|x)
that retains as much information about a target variable Y
while being as compressed as possible. The objective:1
IB ≡ max
Z
I(Z;Y )− σ(−ρ)I(Z;X), (1)
uses a Lagrange multiplier σ(−ρ) to trade off between
the relevant information (I(Z;Y )) and complexity of the
representation (I(Z;X)). Because Z depends only on X
(Z ← X ↔ Y ), Z and Y are independent given X:
I(Z;X,Y ) =I(Z;X) +
I(Z;Y |X)
=I(Z;Y ) + I(Z;X|Y ). (2)
This allows us to write the information bottleneck of Equa-
tion (1) in an equivalent form:
max
Z
I(Z;Y )− e−ρI(Z;X|Y ). (3)
Just as the original Information Bottleneck objective (Equa-
tion (1)) admits a natural variational lower bound (Alemi
et al., 2017), so does this form. We can variationally lower
bound the mutual information between our representation
and the targets with a variational decoder q(y|z):
I(Z;Y ) =Ep(x,y)p(z|x)
[
log
p(y|z)
p(y)
]
≥H(Y ) + Ep(x,y)p(z|x) [log q(y|z)] . (4)
While we may not know H(Y ) exactly for real world
datasets, in the information bottleneck formulation it is a
constant outside of our control and so can be dropped in our
objective. We can variationally upper bound our residual
information:
I(Z;X|Y ) =Ep(x,y)p(z|x)
[
log
p(z|x, y)
p(z|y)
]
≤Ep(x,y)p(z|x)
[
log
p(z|x)
q(z|y)
]
, (5)
with a variational class conditional marginal q(z|y) that
approximates
∫
dx p(z|x)p(x|y). Putting both bounds to-
gether gives us the Conditional Entropy Bottleneck objec-
tive (Fischer, 2018):
min
p(z|x)
Ep(x,y)p(z|x)
[
− log q(y|z) + e−ρ log p(z|x)
q(z|y)
]
(6)
1 The IB objective is ordinarily written with a Lagrange mul-
tiplier β ≡ σ(−ρ) with a natural range from 0 to 1. Here we use
the sigmoid function: σ(−ρ) ≡ 1
1+eρ
to reparameterize in terms
of a control parameter ρ on the whole real line. As ρ → ∞ the
bottleneck turns off.
Compare this with the Variational Information Bottleneck
(VIB) objective (Alemi et al., 2017):
min
p(z|x)
Ep(x,y)p(z|x)
[
log q(y|z)− σ(−ρ) log p(z|x)
q(z)
]
.
(7)
The difference between CEB and VIB is the presence of a
class conditional versus unconditional variational marginal.
As can be seen in Equation (5), using an unconditional
marginal provides a looser variational upper bound on
I(Z;X|Y ). CEB (Equation (6)) can be thought of as a
tighter variational approximation than VIB (Equation (7))
to Equation (3). Since Equation (3) is equivalent to the IB
objective (Equation (1)), CEB can be thought of as a tighter
variational approximation to the IB objective than VIB.
2.2. Implementing a CEB Model
In practice, turning an existing classifier architecture into
a CEB model is very simple. For the stochastic represen-
tation p(z|x) we simply use the original architecture, re-
placing the final softmax layer with a dense layer with d
outputs. These outputs are then used to specify the means
of a d-dimensional Gaussian distribution with unit diagonal
covariance. That is, to form the stochastic representation,
independent standard normal noise is simply added to the
output of the network (z = x + ). For every input, this
stochastic encoder will generate a random d-dimensional
output vector. For the variational classifier q(y|z) any clas-
sifier network can be used, including just a linear softmax
classifier as done in these experiments. For the variational
conditional marginal q(z|y) it helps to use the same dis-
tribution as output by the classifier. For the simple unit
variance Gaussian encoding we used in these experiments,
this requires learning just d parameters per class. For ease
of implementation, this can be represented as single dense
linear layer mapping from a one-hot representation of the
labels to the d-dimensional output, interpreted as the mean
of the corresponding class marginal.
In this setup the CEB loss takes a particularly simple form:
E
[
wy · (f(x) + )− log
∑
y′
ewy′ ·(f(x)+) (8)
− e
−ρ
2
(f(x)− µy) (f(x)− µy + 2)
]
. (9)
Equation (8) is the usual softmax classifier loss, but acting
on our stochastic representation z = f(x)+ , which is sim-
ply the output of our encoder network f(x) with additive
Gaussian noise. The wy is the yth row of weights in the
final linear layer outputing the logits. µy are the learned
class conditional means for our marginal.  are standard
normal draws from an isotropic unit variance Gaussian with
the same dimension as our encoding f(x). Equation (9) is
a stochastic sampling of the KL divergence between our
encoder likelihood and the class conditional marginal likeli-
hood. ρ controls the strength of the bottleneck and can vary
on the whole real line. As ρ→∞ the bottleneck is turned
off. In practice we find that ρ values near but above 0 tend
to work best for modest size models, with the tendency for
the best ρ to approach 0 as the model capacity increases.
Notice that in expectation the second term in the loss is
(f(x) − µy)2, which encourages the learned means µy to
converge to the average of the representations of each ele-
ment in the class. During testing we use the mean encodings
and remove the stochasticity.
In its simplest form, training a CEB classifier amounts to
injecting Gaussian random noise in the penultimate layer
and learning estimates of the class-averaged output of that
layer. In the supplemental material we show simple mod-
ifications to the TPU-compatible ResNet implementation
available on GitHub from the Google TensorFlow Team
(2019) that produce the same core ResNet50 models we use
for our ImageNet experiments.
2.3. Consistent Classifier
An alternative classifier to the standard linear layer de-
scribed in Section 2.2 performs the Bayesian inversion on
the true class-conditional marginal:
p(y|z) = p(z|y)p(y)∑
y′ p(z|y′)p(y′)
. (10)
Substituting q(z|y) and using the empirical distribution over
labels, we can define our variational classifier as:
q(y|z) ≡ softmax(q(z|y)p(y)) (11)
In the case that the labels are uniformly distributed, that
further simplifies to q(y|z) ≡ softmax(q(z|y)). We call
this the consistent classifier because it is Bayes-consistent
with the variational conditional marginal. This is in contrast
to the standard feed-forward classifier, which may choose
to classify a region of the latent space differently from the
highest density class given by the conditional marginal.
2.4. Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
Attacks. The first adversarial attacks were proposed
in Szegedy et al. (2013); Goodfellow et al. (2015). Since
those seminal works, an enormous variety of attacks has
been proposed (Kurakin et al. (2016a;b); Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. (2016); Carlini & Wagner (2017b); Madry et al. (2017);
Eykholt et al. (2017); Baluja & Fischer (2017), etc.). In this
work, we will primarily consider the Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) attack (Madry et al., 2017), which is a multi-
step variant of the early Fast Gradient Method (Goodfellow
et al., 2015). The attack can be viewed as having four pa-
rameters: p, the norm of the attack (typically 2 or ∞), ,
the radius the the p-norm ball within which the attack is
permitted to make changes to an input, n, the number of
gradient steps the adversary is permitted to take, and i, the
per-step limit to modifications of the current input. In this
work, we consider L2 and L∞ attacks of varying  and n,
and with i = 43

n .
Defenses. A common defense for adversarial examples is
adversarial training. Adversarial training was originally pro-
posed in Szegedy et al. (2013), but was not practical until the
Fast Gradient Method was introduced. It has been studied in
detail, with varied techniques (Kurakin et al., 2016b; Madry
et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2019). Adversarial
training can clearly be viewed as a form of data augmen-
tation (Tsipras et al., 2018), where instead of using some
fixed set of functions to modify the training examples, we
use the model itself in combination with one or more adver-
sarial attacks to modify the training examples. As the model
changes, the distribution of modifications changes as well.
However, unlike with non-adversarial data augmentation
techniques, such as AutoAugment (AutoAug) (Cubuk et al.,
2018), adversarial training techniques considered in the lit-
erature so far cause substantial reductions in accuracy on
clean test sets. For example, the CIFAR10 model described
in Madry et al. (2017) gets 95.5% accuracy when trained
normally, but only 87.3% when trained on L∞ adversarial
examples. More recently, Xie et al. (2019) adversarially
trains ImageNet models with impressive robustness to tar-
geted PGD L∞ attacks, but at only 62.32% accuracy on the
non-adversarial test set, compared to 78.81% accuracy for
the same model trained only on clean images.
2.5. Common Corruptions
The Common Corruptions Benchmark (Hendrycks & Diet-
terich, 2019) offers a test of model robustness to common
image processing pipeline corruptions. Figure 3 shows ex-
amples of the benchmark’s 15 corruptions. ImageNet-C
modifies the ImageNet test set with the 15 corruptions ap-
plied at five different strengths. Within each corruption
type we evaluate the average error at each of the five lev-
els (Ec = 15
∑5
s=1Ecs). To summarize the performance
across all corruptions, we report both the average corruption
error (avg = 115
∑
cEc) and the Mean Corruption Error
(mCE) (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019):
mCE =
1
15
∑
c
∑5
s=1Ecs∑5
s=1E
AlexNet
cs
. (12)
The mCE weights the errors on each task against the per-
formance of a baseline AlexNet model. Slightly different
pipelines have been used for the ImageNet-C task (Lopes
et al., 2019). In this work we used the AlexNet normaliza-
tion numbers and data formulation from Yin et al. (2019).
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Figure 1. CEB ρ vs. test set accuracy, and L2 and L∞ PGD adversarial attacks on CIFAR10. The attack parameters were selected to be
about equally difficult for the adversarially-trained WRN 28×10 model from Madry et al. (2017) (grey dashed and dotted lines). The
deterministic baseline (Det.) only gets 8% accuracy on the L∞ attacks, but gets 66% on the L2 attack, substantially better than the 45.7%
of the adversarially-trained model, which makes it clear that the adversarially-trained model failed to generalize in any reasonable way to
the L2 attack. The CEB models are always substantially more robust than Det., and many of them outperform Madry even on the L∞
attack the Madry model was trained on, but for both attacks there is a clear general trend toward more robustness as ρ decreases. Finally,
the CEB and Det. models all reach about the same accuracy, ranging from 93.9% to 95.1%, with Det. at 94.4%. In comparison, Madry
only gets 87.3%. None of the CEB models is adversarially trained.
2.6. Natural Adversarial Examples
The ImageNet-A Benchmark (Hendrycks et al., 2019) is a
dataset of 7,500 naturally-occurring “adversarial” exam-
ples across 200 ImageNet classes. The images exploit
commonly-occurring weaknesses in ImageNet models, such
as relying on textures often seen with certain class labels.
3. Experiments
3.1. CIFAR10 Experiments
We trained a set of 25 28×10 Wide ResNet (WRN) CEB
models on CIFAR10 at ρ ∈ [−1,−0.75, ..., 5], as well as
a deterministic baseline. They trained for 1500 epochs,
lowering the learning rate by a factor of 0.3 after 500, 1000,
and 1250 epochs. This long training regime was due to our
use of the original AutoAug policies, which requires longer
training. The only additional modification we made to the
basic 28×10 WRN architecture was the removal of all Batch
Normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) layers. Every small
CIFAR10 model we have trained with Batch Normalization
enabled has had substantially worse robustness to L∞ PGD
adversaries, even though typically the accuracy is much
higher. For example, 28×10 WRN CEB models rarely
exceeded more than 10% adversarial accuracy. However, it
was always still the case that lower values of ρ gave higher
robustness. As a baseline comparison, a deterministic 28×
10 WRN with BatchNorm, trained with AutoAug reaches
97.3% accuracy on clean images, but 0% accuracy on L∞
PGD attacks at  = 8 and n = 20. Interestingly, that
model was noticeably more robust to L2 PGD attacks than
the deterministic baseline without BatchNorm, getting 73%
accuracy compared to 66%. However, it was still much
weaker than the CEB models, which get over 80% accuracy
on the same attack (Figure 1). Additional training details
are in the supplemental material.
Figure 1 demonstrates the adversarial robustness of CEB
models to both targeted L2 and L∞ attacks. The CEB mod-
els show a marked improvement in robustness to L2 attacks
compared to an adversarially-trained baseline from Madry
et al. (2017) (denoted Madry). Figure 2 shows the robust-
ness of five of those models to PGD attacks as  is varied.
We selected the four CEB models to represent the most ro-
bust models across most of the range of ρ we trained. Note
that of the 25 CEB models we trained, only the models
with ρ ≥ 1 succesfully trained. The remainder collapsed
to chance performance. This is something we observe on
all datasets when training models that are too low capacity.
Only by increasing model capacity does it become possible
to train at low ρ. Note that this result is predicted by the
theory of the onset of learning in the Information Bottleneck
and its relationship to model capacity from Wu et al. (2019).
We additionally tested two models (ρ = 0 and ρ = 5) on
the CIFAR10 Common Corruptions test sets. At the time of
training, we were unaware that AutoAug’s default policies
for CIFAR10 contain brightness and contrast augmentations
that amount to training on those two corruptions from Com-
mon Corruptions (as mentioned in Yin et al. (2019)), so
our results are not appropriate for direct comparison with
other results in the literature. However, they still allow us
to compare the effect of bottlenecking the information be-
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Figure 2. Untargeted adversarial attacks on CIFAR10 models showing both strong robustness to PGD L2 and L∞ attacks, as well as good
test accuracy of up to 95.1%. Left: Accuracy on untargeted L∞ attacks at different values of ε for all 10,000 test set examples. 28×10
indicates the Wide ResNet size. CEBx indicates a CEB model trained at ρ = x. Madry is the adversarially-trained model from Madry
et al. (2017) (values provided by Aleksander Madry). Madry was trained with 7 steps of L∞ PGD at ε = 8 (grey dashed line). All of
the CEB models with ρ ≤ 4 outperform Madry across most of the values of , even though they were not adversarially-trained. Right:
Accuracy on untargeted L2 attacks at different values of ε. Note the switch to log scale on the x axis at L2 = 100. All values are collected
at 20 steps of PGD. It is interesting to note that the Det. model eventually outperforms the CEB5 model on L2 attacks at relatively high
accuracies. None of the CEB models is adversarially-trained.
tween the two models. The ρ = 5 model reached an mCE2
of 61.2. The ρ = 0 model reached an mCE of 52.0, which
is a dramatic relative improvement.
3.2. ImageNet Experiments
To demonstrate CEB’s ability to improve robustness, we
trained four different ResNet architectures on ImageNet
at 224×224 resolution, with and without AutoAug, using
three different objective functions, and then tested them on
ImageNet-C, ImageNet-A, and targeted PGD attacks.
As a simple baseline we trained ResNet50 with no data aug-
mentation using the standard cross-entropy loss (XEnt). We
then trained the same network with CEB at ten different
values of ρ = (1, 2, . . . , 10). AutoAug (Cubuk et al., 2018)
has previously been demonstrated to improve robustness
markedly on ImageNet-C, so next we trained ResNet50 with
AutoAug using XEnt. We similarly trained these AutoAug
ResNet50 networks using CEB at the same ten values of
ρ. ImageNet-C numbers are also sensitive to the model ca-
pacity. To assess whether CEB can benefit larger models,
we repeated the experiments with a modified ResNet50 net-
work where every layer was made twice as wide, training
an XEnt model and ten CEB models, all with AutoAug.
To see if there is any additional benefit or cost to using
the consistent classifier (Section 2.3), we took the same
wide architecture using AutoAug and trained ten consistent
classifier CEB (cCEB) models. Finally, we repeated all of
2The mCE is computed relative to a baseline model. We use
the baseline model from Yin et al. (2019).
the previous experiments using ResNet152: XEnt and CEB
models without AutoAug; with AutoAug; with AutoAug
and twice as wide; and cCEB with AutoAug and twice as
wide. All other hyperparameters (learning rate schedule,
L2 weight decay scale, etc.) remained the same across all
models. All of those hyperparameters where taken from the
ResNet hyperparameters given in the AutoAug paper. In
total we trained 86 ImageNet models: 6 deterministic XEnt
models varying augmentation, width, and depth; 60 CEB
models additionally varying ρ; and 20 cCEB models also
varying ρ. The results for the ResNet50 models are summa-
rized in Figure 3. For ResNet152, see Figure 4. See Table 1
for detailed results across the matrix of experiments.
The CEB models highlighted in Figures 3 and 4 and Table 1
were selected by cross validation. These were values of
ρ that gave the best clean test set accuracy. Despite be-
ing selected for classical generalization, these models also
demonstrate a high degree of robustness on both average-
and worst-case perturbations. In the case that more than one
model gets the same test set accuracy, we choose the model
with the lower ρ, since we know that lower ρ correlates with
higher robustness. The only model where we had to make
this decision was for ResNet152 with AutoAug, where five
models all were within 0.1% of each other, so we chose the
ρ = 3 model, rather than ρ ∈ {5...8}.
Accuracy, ImageNet-C, and ImageNet-A. Increasing
model capacity and using AutoAug have positive effects
on classification accuracy, as well as on robustness to
ImageNet-C and ImageNet-A, but for all three classes of
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Figure 3. Summary of the ResNet50 ImageNet-C experiments. Lower is better in all cases. In the main part of the figure (in blue), the
average errors across corruption magnitude are shown for 33 different networks for each of the labeled Common Corruptions, ImageNet-A,
and targeted PGD attacks. The networks come in paired sets, with the vertical lines denoting the baseline XEnt network’s performance,
and then in the corresponding color the errors for each of 10 different CEB networks are shown with varying ρ = [1, 2, . . . , 10], arranged
from 10 at the top to 1 at the bottom. The light blue lines indicate ResNet50 models trained without AutoAug. The blue lines show the
same network trained with AutoAug. The dark blue lines show ResNet50 AutoAug networks that were made twice as wide. For these
models, we display cCEB rather than CEB, which gave qualitatively similar but slightly weaker performance. The figure separately shows
the effects of data augmentation, enlarging the model, and the additive effect of CEB on each model. At the top in red are shown the same
data for three summary statistics. clean denotes the clean top-1 errors of each of the networks. mCE denotes the AlexNet regularized
average corruption errors. avg shows an equally-weighted average across all common corruptions. The dots denote the value for each
CEB network and each corruption at ρ∗, the optimum ρ for the network as measured in terms of clean error. The values at these dots and
the baseline values are given in detail in Table 1. Figure 4 show the same data for the ResNet152 models.
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Figure 4. Replication of Figure 3 but for ResNet152. Lower is better in all cases. The light blue lines indicate ResNet152 models trained
without AutoAug. The blue lines show the same network trained with AutoAug. The dark blue lines show ResNet152 AutoAug networks
that were made twice as wide. As in Figure 3, we show the cCEB models for the largest network to reduce visual clutter. The deeper
model shows marked improvement across the board compared to ResNet50, but the improvements due to CEB and cCEB are even more
striking. Notice in particular the adversarial robustness to L∞ and L2 PGD attacks for the CEB models over the XEnt baselines. The L∞
baselines all have error rates above 99.9%, so they are only barely visible along the right edge of the figure. See Table 1 for details of the
best-performing models, which correspond to the dots in this figure.
Architecture ResNet152x2 ResNet152 ResNet152-aa ResNet50x2 ResNet50 ResNet50-aa
Objective cCEB CEB XEnt CEB XEnt CEB XEnt cCEB CEB XEnt CEB XEnt CEB XEnt
ρ∗ 2 2 NA 3 NA 3 NA 4 3 NA 6 NA 4 NA
Clean 19.1% 19.3% 20.7% 19.9% 20.7% 21.6% 22.4% 20.0% 20.2% 21.8% 21.9% 22.5% 22.8% 24.0%
mCE 60.1% 60.4% 64.8% 62.9% 64.6% 71.9% 76.9% 65.5% 65.7% 69.7% 70.4% 72.2% 77.7% 81.2%
Average CE 47.5% 47.8% 51.3% 49.7% 51.1% 56.9% 60.8% 51.9% 52.0% 55.2% 55.7% 57.2% 61.5% 64.3%
Gauss. Noise 46.6% 48.0% 53.0% 49.7% 51.9% 60.3% 67.8% 53.5% 52.3% 57.2% 57.7% 59.8% 65.4% 71.3%
Shot Noise 47.2% 48.5% 53.6% 50.3% 52.5% 62.0% 69.2% 53.8% 52.8% 57.9% 58.0% 60.2% 67.3% 72.8%
Impulse Noise 50.5% 51.9% 58.4% 54.2% 56.7% 63.0% 72.2% 59.2% 58.3% 63.8% 63.1% 66.4% 70.8% 76.8%
Defocus Blur 54.7% 53.8% 58.0% 57.8% 56.7% 61.5% 61.4% 59.5% 59.9% 61.9% 63.2% 64.4% 65.8% 66.3%
Glass Blur 60.4% 59.5% 63.1% 60.3% 62.1% 69.2% 70.5% 62.8% 64.0% 65.0% 67.1% 67.1% 73.8% 74.5%
Motion Blur 50.9% 52.3% 55.6% 55.0% 56.7% 57.4% 59.2% 58.3% 58.2% 60.6% 62.8% 63.2% 64.5% 66.3%
Zoom Blur 56.6% 57.0% 59.0% 58.8% 59.3% 59.4% 61.7% 60.0% 60.1% 62.1% 63.6% 65.2% 63.0% 64.5%
Snow 56.6% 56.6% 61.6% 57.8% 61.5% 66.1% 70.6% 61.4% 61.6% 65.8% 65.4% 68.3% 71.4% 74.5%
Frost 51.6% 52.4% 54.8% 54.6% 55.7% 61.1% 64.4% 56.2% 56.2% 59.5% 59.8% 62.0% 65.3% 68.3%
Fog 45.1% 45.1% 49.3% 46.0% 49.6% 56.2% 59.3% 46.8% 47.3% 52.8% 51.0% 53.0% 58.3% 63.3%
Brightness 26.5% 26.6% 28.8% 28.2% 28.7% 32.6% 34.5% 28.2% 28.8% 31.1% 31.0% 31.8% 34.2% 36.4%
Contrast 48.6% 48.3% 50.3% 51.1% 50.5% 61.3% 64.9% 52.3% 53.5% 55.6% 56.6% 57.3% 65.4% 68.4%
Elastic Trans. 47.2% 47.6% 49.2% 49.4% 50.5% 52.2% 53.7% 51.3% 51.4% 54.0% 54.3% 55.8% 56.0% 57.8%
Pixelate 34.3% 34.2% 36.4% 36.1% 36.1% 48.2% 56.5% 36.2% 36.3% 38.2% 39.7% 40.6% 55.1% 55.7%
JPEG Comp. 35.3% 35.1% 37.9% 36.5% 37.4% 42.4% 47.0% 38.5% 38.8% 41.7% 41.7% 42.3% 46.2% 47.9%
ImageNet-A 83.8% 83.7% 86.2% 87.6% 87.9% 91.6% 93.4% 87.5% 88.8% 90.5% 92.2% 93.3% 94.9% 96.8%
PGD L2 80.4% 80.4% 99.9% 85.0% 99.9% 84.1% 99.9% 95.7% 99.4% 99.9% 99.7% 99.9% 99.4% 99.9%
PGD L∞ 80.9% 80.3% 99.3% 85.1% 99.4% 83.9% 99.5% 95.5% 99.5% 99.9% 99.8% 99.9% 99.4% 99.9%
Table 1. Baseline and cross-validated CEB values for the ImageNet experiments. cCEB uses the consistent classifier. XEnt is the
baseline cross entropy objective. “-aa” indicates AutoAug is not used during training. “x2” indicates the ResNet architecture is twice as
wide. The CEB values reported here are denoted with the dots in Figures 3 and 4. Lower values are better in all cases, and the lowest value
for each architecture is shown in bold. For the XEnt 152x2 and 152 models, the smaller model (152) actually has better mCE and equally
good top-1 accuracy, indicating that the wider model may be overfitting, but the 152x2 CEB and cCEB models substantially outperform
both of them across the board. cCEB gives a noticeable boost over CEB for clean accuracy and mCE in both wide architectures, and large
gains in the adversarial settings for all architectures except ResNet152x2 where cCEB and CEB are essentially equally robust.
models CEB gives substantial additional improvements.
cCEB gives a small but noticeable additional gain for all
three cases (except indistinguishable performance compared
to CEB on ImageNet-A with the wide ResNet152 architec-
ture), indicating that enforcing variational consistency is a
reasonable modification to the CEB objective. In Table 1 we
can see that CEB’s relative accuracy gains increase as the
architecture gets larger, from gains of 1.2% for ResNet50
and ResNet152 without AutoAug, to 1.6% and 1.8% for
the wide models with AutoAug. This indicates that even
larger relative gains may be possible when using CEB to
train larger architectures than those considered here.
Targeted PGD Attacks. We tested on the random-target
version of the PGD L2 and L∞ attacks (Kurakin et al.,
2016a). Both attacks used  = 16, n = 20, and i = 2,
which is considered to be a strong attack still (Xie et al.,
2019). Model capacity makes a substantial difference to
whitebox adversarial attacks. In particular, none of the
ResNet-50 models perform well, with all but cCEB getting
less than 1% top-1 accuracy. However, the Resnet-152 CEB
models show a dramatic improvement over the XEnt model,
with top-1 accuracy increasing from 0.09% to 17.09% be-
tween the XEnt baseline without AutoAug and the corre-
sponding ρ = 2 CEB model, a relative increase of 187
times. CEB and cCEB give increases nearly as large for the
AutoAug and wide AutoAug models. Interestingly, for the
PGD attacks, AutoAug was detrimental – the ResNet152
models without AutoAug were more robust than those with
AutoAug. As with the accuracy results above, the relative
robustness gains due to CEB increase as model capacity
increases, indicating that further relative gains are possible.
4. Conclusion
The Conditional Entropy Bottleneck (CEB) provides a sim-
ple mechanism to improve robustness of image classifiers.
We have shown a strong trend toward increased robustness
as ρ decreases in the standard 28×10 Wide ResNet model
on CIFAR10, and that this increased robustness does not
come at the expense of accuracy relative to the determinis-
tic baseline. We have shown that CEB models at a range
of ρ outperform an adversarially-trained baseline model,
even on the attack the adversarial model was trained on, and
have incidentally shown that the adversarially-trained model
generalizes to at least one other attack less well than a deter-
ministic baseline. Finally, we have shown that on ImageNet,
CEB provides substantial gains over deterministic baselines
in validation set accuracy, robustness to Common Corrup-
tions, Natural Adversarial Examples, and targeted Projected
Gradient Descent attacks. We hope these empirical demon-
strations inspire further theoretical and practical study of the
use of bottlenecking techniques to encourage improvements
to both classical generalization and robustness.
A. Experiment Details
Here we give additional technical details for the CIFAR10
and ImageNet experiments.
A.1. CIFAR10 Experiment Details
We trained all of the models using Adam (Kingma & Ba,
2015) at a base learning rate of 10−3. We lowered the
learning rate three times by a factor of 0.3 each time. The
only additional trick to train the CIFAR10 models was to
start with ρ = 100, anneal down to ρ = 10 over 2 epochs,
and then anneal to the target ρ over one epoch once training
exceeded a threshold of 20%. This jump-start method is
inspired by experiments on VIB in Wu et al. (2019). It
makes it much easier to train models at low ρ, and appears
to not negatively impact final performance.
A.2. ImageNet Experiment Details
We follow the learning rate schedule for the ResNet 50
from Cubuk et al. (2018), which has a top learning rate of
1.6, trains for 270 epochs, and drops the learning rate by a
factor of 10 at 90, 180, and 240 epochs. The only difference
for all of our models is that we train at a batch size of
8192 rather than 4096. Similar to the CIFAR10 models, in
order to ensure that the ImageNet models train at low ρ, we
employ a simple jump-start. We start at ρ = 100 and anneal
down to the target ρ over 12,000 steps. The first learning
rate drop occurs a bit after 14,000 steps. Also similar to the
CIFAR10 28×10 WRN experiments, none of the models we
trained at ρ = 0 succeeded, indicating that ResNet50 and
wide ResNet50 both have insufficient capacity to fully learn
ImageNet. We were able to train ResNet152 at ρ = 0, but
only by disabling L2 weight decay and using a slightly lower
learning rate. Since that involved additional hyperparameter
tuning, we don’t report those results here, beyond noting that
it is possible, and that those models reached top-1 accuracy
around 72%.
B. CEB Example Code
In Listings 1 to 3 we give annotated code changes needed to
make ResNet CEB models, based on the TPU-compatible
ResNet implementation from the Google TensorFlow Team
(2019).
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# In model.py:
def resnet_v1_generator(block_fn, layers, num_classes, ...):
def model(inputs, is_training):
# Build the ResNet model as normal up to the following lines:
inputs = tf.reshape(
inputs, [-1, 2048 if block_fn is bottleneck_block else 512])
# Now, instead of the final dense layer, just return inputs,
# which for ResNet50 models is a [batch_size, 2048] tensor.
return inputs
Listing 1: Modifications to the model.py file.
# In resnet_main.py add the following imports and functions:
import tensorflow_probability as tfp
tfd = tfp.distributions
def ezx_dist(x):
"""Builds the encoder distribution, e(z|x)."""
dist = tfd.MultivariateNormalDiag(loc=x)
return dist
def bzy_dist(y, num_classes=1000, z_dims=2048):
"""Builds the backwards distribution, b(z|y)."""
y_onehot = tf.one_hot(y, num_classes)
mus = tf.layers.dense(y_onehot, z_dims, activation=None)
dist = tfd.MultivariateNormalDiag(loc=mus)
return dist
def cyz_dist(z, num_classes=1000):
"""Builds the classifier distribution, c(y|z)."""
# For the classifier, we are using exactly the same dense layer
# initialization as was used for the final layer that we removed
# from model.py.
logits = tf.layers.dense(
z, num_classes, activation=None,
kernel_initializer=tf.random_normal_initializer(stddev=.01))
return tfd.Categorical(logits=logits)
def lerp(global_step, start_step, end_step, start_val, end_val):
"""Utility function to linearly interpolate two values."""
interp = (tf.cast(global_step - start_step, tf.float32)
/ tf.cast(end_step - start_step, tf.float32))
interp = tf.maximum(0.0, tf.minimum(1.0, interp))
return start_val * (1.0 - interp) + end_val * interp
Listing 2: Modification to the head of resnet main.py.
# Still in resnet_main.py, modify resnet_model_fn as follows:
def resnet_model_fn(features, labels, mode, params):
# Nothing changes until after the definition of build_network:
def build_network():
# Elided, unchanged implementation of build_network.
if params['precision'] == 'bfloat16':
# build_network now returns the pre-logits, so we'll change
# the variable name from logits to net.
with tf.contrib.tpu.bfloat16_scope():
net = build_network()
net = tf.cast(net, tf.float32)
elif params['precision'] == 'float32':
net = build_network()
# Get the encoder, e(z|x):
with tf.variable_scope('ezx', reuse=tf.AUTO_REUSE):
ezx = ezx_dist(net)
# Get the backwards encoder, b(z|y):
with tf.variable_scope('bzy', reuse=tf.AUTO_REUSE):
bzy = bzy_dist(labels)
# Only sample z during training. Otherwise, just pass through
# the mean value of the encoder.
if mode == tf.estimator.ModeKeys.TRAIN:
z = ezx.sample()
else:
z = ezx.mean()
# Get the classifier, c(y|z):
with tf.variable_scope('cyz', reuse=tf.AUTO_REUSE):
cyz = cyz_dist(z, params)
# cyz.logits is the same as what the unmodified ResNet model would return.
logits = cyz.logits
# Compute the individual conditional entropies:
hzx = -ezx.log_prob(z) # H(Z|X)
hzy = -bzy.log_prob(z) # H(Z|Y) (upper bound)
hyz = -cyz.log_prob(labels) # H(Y|Z) (upper bound)
# I(X;Z|Y) = -H(Z|X) + H(Z|Y)
# >= -hzx + hzy =: Rex, the residual information.
rex = -hzx + hzy
rho = 3.0 # You should make this a hyperparameter.
rho_to_gamma = lambda rho: 1.0 / np.exp(rho)
gamma = tf.cast(rho_to_gamma(rho), tf.float32)
# Get the global step now, so that we can adjust rho dynamically.
global_step = tf.train.get_global_step()
anneal_rho = 12000 # You should make this a hyperparameter.
if anneal_rho > 0:
# Anneal rho from 100 down to the target rho
# over the first anneal_rho steps.
gamma = lerp(global_step, 0, aneal_rho,
rho_to_gamma(100.0), gamma)
# Replace all the softmax cross-entropy loss computation with the following line:
loss = tf.reduce_mean(gamma * rex + hyz)
# The rest of resnet_model_fn can remain unchanged.
Listing 3: Modifications to resnet model fn in resnet main.py.
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